Asian-Pacific ESA Conference, Taipei, 16-18 February, 2017

The 3rd International Academic Conference on Social Sciences and Management. 24-26 May, 2017. Bangkok

Steffen Altmann, Armin Falk, Matthias Wibral. Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments

Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. We analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments. In our two main treatments, we compare a two-stage tournament to a one-stage tournament. Subjects in the two-stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage, both with respect to Nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one-stage tournament. Additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above-equilibrium effort might be driven by li ...


Christopher Burke

About himself: I use behavioral and neuroimaging methods to investigate how people make value-based decisions and learn from rewards or punishments. I am particularly interested in how the brain integ...

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Geoffrey M. Hodgson. The ubiquity of habits and rules

Under what circumstances is it necessary or convenient for an agent to rely on habits or rules? This paper focuses on the types of decision situation giving rise to their use. Even optimisation requ...


Jess Benhabib, Boyan Jovanovic. Externalities And Growth Accounting

We reexamine several bodies of data on the growth of output, labor, and capital, within the context of a model that admits the possibility of an externality to the capital input. The model is an aug...


Rainer Winkelmann. Conspicuous consumption and satisfaction

Traditional tools of welfare economics identify the envy-related welfare loss from conspicuous consumption only under very strong assumptions. Measured income and life satisfaction offers an alternat...


Manfred Spitzer, Urs Fischbacher, Baerbel Herrnberger, Georg Groen, Ernst Fehr. The Neural Signature of Social Norm Compliance

All known human societies establish social order by punishing violators of social norms. However, little is known about how the brain processes the punishment threat associated with norm violations. W...


Eva Ranehill, Frédéric Schneider, Roberto A. Weber. Growing Groups, Cooperation, and the Rate of Entry

We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential ...


Dennis A. V. Dittrich, Martin G. Kocher. Monitoring and Pay: An Experiment on Employee Performance under Endogenous Supervision

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable...